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Introduction
The purpose of this study is to estimate of the risk premium for investing in Hong Kong
real estate and to assess the effects of the 1997 repossession of Hong Kong by mainland
China, if any, on the risk premium.
Ever since Margaret Thatcher visited China in 1983 concerning the future of Hong
Kong, the 1997 issue has been a major concern for all Hong Kong real estate investors.
Not only has it affected the thinking of all Hong Kong people, the issue has attracted
more and more attention internationally as Hong Kong’s real estate investment market
has become increasingly international.
In 1997, Hong Kong, one of the world’s freest economies, was to be handed back to
China, the largest planned economy in the world. Despite the fact that the British
Government and the Chinese Government signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration in
1984, which guarantees that the economic system and the life style of people in Hong
Kong shall remain unchanged for ﬁfty years after 1997, the investment environment post-
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Abstract. This study investigates the effects of political uncertainty associated with the
1997 repossession of Hong Kong by China on the real estate market. Such effect is reﬂected
in the change in the real estate risk premiums. A model is derived to estimate the trend of
real estate risk premium for each subsector of the real estate market from observable
market data. The results suggest that there was a discrete jump in the risk premiums when
the 1997 issue was revealed to the public in 1983, indicating investor concern about the
post-1997 future of Hong Kong. The increase in the risk premium is much more obvious in
nonresidential real estate than in the residential sector. This is probably due to its dual
nature (an investment good as well as a good for self-consumption) and the effects of rent
control, which only applies to the residential units. However there is also very strong
evidence that investor conﬁdence has been increasing recently, thus leading to a decline in
the implied post-1997 risk premium, although the increasing conﬁdence is still not sufﬁcient
to bring the risk premium back to pre-1983 levels. If the concern about the repossession of
Hong Kong by China turns out to be unnecessary after 1997, a re-valuation of the risk
premium will take place. This will bring the risk premium level back to the pre-1983 level,
assuming no other signiﬁcant changes have taken place. Other things being equal, such re-
valuation will result in a one-time discrete increase in property prices. This is in contrast to
the common view that investors have already discounted the 1997 Hong Kong/China issue
completely.1997 has become more uncertain. Deng Xiaoping’s one-country, two-system model is
certainly innovative and is perhaps one of the best solutions for solving the political,
economic and ideological issues that may arise as Hong Kong becomes part of China on
July 1, 1997. However it is also because of its novelty that uncertainty arises.
Uncertainty is always associated with new ideas, although such ideas might prove to be
excellent later. Uncertainty about what might happen after July 1, 1997 increases the risk
of investing in Hong Kong, but this is especially true for real estate, since real estate is not
as liquid as other forms of investment, and real estate assets are immobile.
At the same time, the economic reform in China, which started in 1979, has opened up
numerous opportunities for both Hong Kong and overseas investors. Hong Kong’s
economy has beneﬁted from the huge supply of cheap labour and land in China and vast
trading opportunities (due to convenient access to a huge virgin market with a
population of 1.2 billion).
Ever since the economic reform in China, the GDP of Hong Kong has been growing at
an average rate of 8% in real terms (see Census and Statistics Department, 1994). As a
result of this spectacular economic growth, some people argue that the political risk
associated with 1997 has been vanishing and has by now virtually disappeared. An even
more optimistic view is that the 1997 issue is in fact a positive factor. The argument is
that as Hong Kong became part of China (as of July 1, 1997), Hong Kong would further
beneﬁt as China’s economy continues to open up. This view is sometimes supported by
opinion surveys of investor conﬁdence about the future of Hong Kong.
One of the most frequently cited pieces of ‘‘evidence’’ by the media in support of the
above optimistic view is the declining trends in rental yields or capitalization rates. Up
until the late 1980s, the average capitalization rate for Hong Kong’s real estate market
was about 10%. The average capitalization rate has declined since then. It is now
approximately 5%. The decline in capitalization rates has been interpreted as a decrease
in the risk premium for investing in Hong Kong real estate, which also implies an increase
in investor conﬁdence about the future of Hong Kong.
The problem with this simplistic interpretation is that the capitalization rate is affected
by other factors, such as interest rates, expected long-term rental growth capital,
appreciation, etc., besides the risk premium. A decrease in the capitalization rate does not
necessarily imply a decrease in the risk premium. In order to assess whether the 1997
issue has had any effect upon the risk premium, other factors affecting the capitalization
rate must be taken into account.
Research Design
Whether the 1997 issue has any effect upon the risk premium of real estate investment in
Hong Kong is an empirical question. The major objectives of this study are to test
whether such an effect exists and to estimate its change over time. The study is positive in
nature in that the results have no connotation about whether the future arrangements for
Hong Kong, as stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, are realistic or
achievable, nor do they imply the practicability of the one-country, two-system policy.
The result simply shows the market’s assessment of real estate investment risk resulting
from the 1997 issue, if any. It does not mean that the market’s ex ante assessment is
correct; it is simply a fact. The market’s expectations might easily prove to be wrong, ex
post, either positive or negative.
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investor investment strategy. Since the risk premium is implicit in the capitalization rate,
explicit estimation of the risk premium can help investors assess the risk premium they
have to pay and therefore enable them to make more informed investment decisions.
Land in Hong Kong is leasehold rather than freehold. However the lease period is very
long (over seventy-ﬁve years in general). Therefore, the freehold formula is a good
approximation. By deﬁnition, the rental yield or capitalization rate of an unleveraged
freehold real estate is:
(1)
where A is the current market rental income per annum and V is the capital value of the
property. Ignoring the effect of depreciation, R is also the discount rate since equation (1)
can also be written as:
(2)
where n is approaching inﬁnity or very large (say $ﬁfty years). The nominal rate of
return for real estate investment (RN) is deﬁned as the discount rate that reduces the
nominal stream of net rental income, taking into account the expected future rental
growth, to the current market capital value. Therefore:
(3)
where g is the expected long-term rental growth, which is also equal to expected long-
term capital appreciation, assuming the changes in capitalization rates are negligible in
the long run. The market equilibrium capital value is determined in the long run by
expected future rental income.




However, RN is not directly observable, therefore an indirect means of estimating RN is
necessary. In theory, it is determined by the nominal risk-free rate-of-return (opportunity
cost of money) and the return for bearing the risk of real estate investment (or the risk
premium). That is, RN can be broken down into two major components so that:
RN5RF1RP , (6)


















































POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY, REAL ESTATE RISK PREMIUMS, HONG KONG 299investment risk premium. We have ignored the difference in transaction costs between
investing in risk-free investment vehicles (such as government bonds) and those of
investing in real estate assets. This, however, is not important for the purpose of this study
since such difference is unlikely to change substantially over time.
Combining equation (5) and (6) yields:
Rp5R2RF1g1Rg . (7)
Therefore the risk premium can be estimated from the capitalization rate, long-term
nominal risk-free interest rate and expected long-term rental growth. Data required for
estimating these variables are described in the next section.
The reader should note that equation (7) is derived using the constant growth model.
While the model can be a good approximation, it can also distort the results if growth
rates ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly in early years. This, however, should not have any signiﬁcant
effects on the results of this study since its focus is on long-term changes, rather than
short-term ﬂuctuations.
The 1997 issue was revealed to the general public in 1983. Assuming that the market is
efﬁcient with respect to publicly available information, the impact of the 1997 issue can
be assessed by comparing the risk premium before and after 1983. A sustained increase
in the observed risk premium after 1983 would indicate an increase in the perceived
uncertainty associated with the 1997 issue.
In order to assess whether there has been any change in investor perceptions about the
real estate investment risk associated with 1997, it is necessary to estimate the implied
post-1997 risk premium from the observed risk premium. In order to do this, it must be
assumed that the 1997 issue only affected investor conﬁdence about the income generated
from the real estate asset after 1997. That is, the risk associated with the rental income
before 1997 would be the same as if there were no 1997 issue. The stream of rental
incomes before and after 1997 should therefore be discounted using different discount
rates (implying different risk premiums) such that:
(8)
where n is the number of years to mid-1997, Rpb and Rpa are, respectively, the implied risk
premium before and after 1997. Assuming that the risk premium remains stationary had
there been no 1997 issue, the implied pre-1997 risk premium (Rpb) can be estimated from
the average risk premium before 1983 (when the 1997 issue was not known to the public)
using equation (7). Equation (8) can be interpreted as pricing the real estate asset as if it
has an artiﬁcial expiration date (mid-1997), after which its nature will be different
resulting in a different risk premium, and therefore, a different discount rate.
The variable Rpa in equation (8) can only be solved using numerical methods, since it is
a polynomial of order n. Since Rpa is an indicator of investor conﬁdence about the post-
1997 era, if the trend of Rpa is decreasing (increasing), then investor conﬁdence about
Hong Kong’s future after 1997 is increasing (decreasing). The impact of the 1997 issue
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Capitalization Rate (R)
Historical information on capitalization rates in Hong Kong has been scattered and not
readily available. Fortunately, rental and capital price indexes for different types of real
estate can be obtained from the Rating and Valuation Department (RVD) of the Hong
Kong Government. Rental and capital price indexes of retail premises (shops), ofﬁces,
ﬂatted (multistorey) factories, and different categories of private residential premises are
available for the 1978–94 period. Residential premises are further subdivided by the
Rating and Valuation Department into ﬁve classes according to unit size as follows:
Class A below 39.9 m2
Class B 40–69.9 m2
Class C 70–99.9 m2
Class D 100–159.9 m2
Class E over 160 m2
Rental and price indexes are available for Class A, B, C, and Class D/E combined.
The rental and price indexes are constructed based upon actual market transactions
adjusted for quality differences using the Rating and Valuation Department’s assessment
of the ratable value. The following paragraphs were extracted from the technical notes of
the Rating and Valuation Department (1994). They indicate the characteristics of the
rental and property price indexes:
Average rentals are based on an analysis of rental information recorded by the
department for fresh lettings (new leases) effective in the quarter being
analyzed. For non-domestic (commercial real estate) premises, rentals
negotiated on renewal are also included.
Average rentals and prices may change from one period to another not only
because of value changes, but also because of shifts in quality. The rental and
price indices, on the other hand, are designed to measure rental and price
changes with quality kept at a constant. Movement of the indices may,
therefore, differ from changes in the average rentals and prices for the same
period.
The rental and price indices are derived from the same data that is used to
compile average rentals and prices. The indices measure value changes by using
rental or price, divided by ratable value of the subject properties, rather than
by reference to the rental or price per square meter of ﬂoor area. In effect, by
utilizing ratable value, allowance is made not only for ﬂoor area, but also for
other qualitative differences between properties.
Compared with other valuation-based indexes produced by private-sector consultants,
the RVD indexes are more suitable for this analysis, since they are free from the appraisal-
smoothing problems. Examples of research on the problems associated with bias
resulting from appraisal smoothing include Burns and Epley (1982), Chan, Hendershott
and Sanders (1990), Firstenberg, Ross and Zisler (1988), Geltner (1991), Giliberto (1988,
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY, REAL ESTATE RISK PREMIUMS, HONG KONG 3011993), Lee (1987), Newell (1994), Webb, Miles and Guilkey (1992), and Wheaton and
Torto (1989). Another reason for using the RVD data is that they are available over a
longer time horizon than any other similar series currently available in Hong Kong.
Equation (1) is also applicable to the respective indexes; therefore the trends of the
capitalization rates for different types of real estate can be estimated from the respective
price and rental indexes. However, this method assumes a 100% occupation rate.
Therefore the capitalization rate trend has to be adjusted for changes in vacancy rates, i.e.,
(9)
where Rt, At and Vt are the indexes of capitalization rates, rental incomes and prices
respectively, and vt is the vacancy rate during time t. Vacancy rates are available from the
Rating and Valuation Department on a yearly basis (year end) only. For the purpose of
this study, quarterly ﬁgures are estimated by linear interpolation between the available
year-end ﬁgures.
By estimating the average capitalization rate (adjusted for vacancy rate) of a particular
period, say, the fourth quarter 1994, historical capitalization rates can be derived from
the capitalization rate trends estimated from the rental and price indexes. A similar
method is used by the Rating and Valuation Department (1994) to arrive at the
capitalization rates (before adjustment for vacancy rates). Their ﬁgures are very similar to
the author’s estimate (before adjustment for vacancy rates). Exhibits 1 through 7 show
the trends of capitalization rates for seven sectors of the Hong Kong real estate market.
Nominal Risk-Free Interest Rate (RF)
In theory, RF is the interest rate of a risk-free bond with no maturity date. In practice, RF
is normally estimated by the ten-year government bond yield. The ten-year bond yield
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Exhibit 1
Implied Capitalization Rate—Residential (Class A)
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Exhibit 2
Implied Capitalization Rate—Residential (Class B)
Exhibit 3
Implied Capitalization Rate—Residential (Class C)
Exhibit 4
Implied Capitalization Rate—Residential (Class D/E)
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Implied Capitalization Rate—Retail Shops
Exhibit 7
Implied Capitalization Rate—Flatted Factories
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)a premium over and above the ten-year bond yield. However, such differences are small
and should be relatively consistent over time. Therefore the use of the ten-year bond yield
should not signiﬁcantly effect the results of the analysis.
However, the Hong Kong government has never issued long-term government bonds.
Fortunately, long-term risk-free interest rates in Hong Kong after 1983 can be estimated
using the ten-year U.S. government bond yield which is readily available from the
International Financial Statistics Yearbook published by the International Monetary
Fund, Washington, D.C. The use of the U.S. long-term interest rate as a proxy for the
Hong Kong long-term interest rate is possible because the Hong Kong dollar has been
pegged to the U.S. dollar at a rate of one U.S. dollar to 7.8 Hong Kong dollars since 1983.
Under this system, the note-issuing banks in Hong Kong (currently there are three of
them: the Hong Kong Bank, Standard Chartered Bank and the Bank of China) have to
deposit one U.S. dollar with the Hong Kong Government’s Exchange Fund whenever
HK$7.8 is issued and the Exchange Fund also guarantees exchange (between H.K. and
U.S. dollars) with the note-issuing banks at the pegged rate. This system has effectively
turned all Hong Kong dollars into U.S. dollars. Therefore, the interest rates of the two
currencies should be approximately the same and thus the post-1983 long-term interest
rate in Hong Kong can be estimated by using the long-term U.S. government fund yield.
For the purpose of this study, the potential risk of the Hong Kong government not being
able to maintain the peg is ignored. Such risk will lead to an under- or overestimation of
the long-term risk-free interest rate depending upon whether there is upward or
downward pressure on the exchange rate of Hong Kong dollars. While it is difﬁcult to
assess the direction and magnitude of this bias directly, the shorter term interest rates of
Hong Kong and U.S. dollars are almost identical; therefore the bias resulting from such
risk should not be signiﬁcant.
Before 1983, the interest rates of the two currencies were not exactly in line with each
other, although they were closely related due to the strong dependency of Hong Kong’s
economy upon the U.S. economy. For the purpose of this study, long-term interest rates
before 1983 were estimated from short-term interest rates, assuming that the term struc-
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Exhibit 8
Long-Term Nominal Risk-Free Interest Rate












ttures of interest rates in Hong Kong and the U.S. were similar. Exhibit 8 shows the
estimated long-term risk-free interest rates.
Expected Rental Growth (g)
Measurement of the expected long-term rental growth (g) involves the analyses of how
expectations are formed. There is a substantial amount of research literature on the
theory of expectation formation and the measurement of expected price changes.
Examples of research on estimating expectations include Dougherty and Van Order
(1982), Harris (1989) and Hendershott and Hu (1981).
For the purpose of this study, the assumption that people’s expectations about future
rental price changes depend upon historical and current rental prices has been used, i.e.,
gt5f(Pt2i) i51, 2, 3, . . . , (10)
where the Pt2i’s are current and historical rental prices. In order to estimate the expected
long-term rental growth, long real estate rental price series are required. They are,
however, lacking in Hong Kong. So for the purpose of this study, expected long-term
rental growth is assumed to be not signiﬁcantly different from expected long-term
inﬂation. We have to use expected inﬂation rate as a proxy for expected rental growth rate
since a much longer time series for general inﬂation is available. The available rental price
series is not long enough for us to estimate expected rental growth using equation (10).
The implicit price deﬂator for private consumption expenditures is used as the inﬂation
index. Expected rental growth, (g), is estimated as the moving average of the annual
percentage changes in this index. It is difﬁcult to determine the number of periods for the
moving average. Moving averages of different quarters are used. The author has chosen
to report the results of using a twelve-quarter moving average in this study. However the
use of moving averages greater than eight quarters procured similar results. In fact, the
longer the moving average used, the more signiﬁcant were the results. Therefore it is only
necessary to assume that real estate investors have memories of more than eight quarters
in terms of forming their long-term rental growth expectations, which is not unreasonable
given the nature of real estate.
Results
The trends of Rp for all the property sectors are calculated using equation (7). The trends
are shown in Exhibits 9 through 15. The dotted horizontal lines show the subperiod
averages before and after the fourth quarter 1982 (when the 1997 issue was revealed to the
general public). The solid lines show the trends of the estimated risk premiums.
All trends show signiﬁcant ﬂuctuation over time, which is likely to result from random
data error and the sluggish response of rental and capital prices to changing demand and
supply conditions. Such variances are, however, short term and random, rather than
systematic in nature and thus would not signiﬁcantly effect the reliability of the results.
To test whether there was a jump in the risk premium after the 1997 issue was revealed
to the general public (in the fourth quarter 1982), the difference between the average
values of Rp before and after 1983 were calculated for each property type. A standard t-
test was used to determine whether the observed differences are statistically signiﬁcant for
each property type. Exhibit 16 summarizes the results.
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Exhibit 9
Risk Premium—Residential (Class A)
Exhibit 10
Risk Premium—Residential (Class B)
Exhibit 11
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Exhibit 12


















































































Subperiod averagesAll the property types exhibit an increase in the risk premium after 1983 and the
increases are all signiﬁcant at the 99% level of conﬁdence. The increase in the risk
premium is, however, larger and more signiﬁcant (larger t-statistics) for the nonresidential
property types. Among the residential property types, the results are more signiﬁcant for
larger units than for smaller ones. The results for Class A, B and C are very similar.
Statistical tests cannot reject (at 90% level of conﬁdence) the hypothesis that the increase
in risk premiums for the smaller units (Class A, B, and C) are the same (Exhibit 17).
However, the risk premium increases for larger units (Class D/E) are signiﬁcantly higher
than those of the smaller units (Class A, B and C). The differences in risk premium
increases between large units and smaller units are statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% level
of conﬁdence (Exhibit 17).
Such results can be accounted for by two reasons. First, residential units potentially
have a dual nature. They can be both an investment vehicle, as well as a consumption
































Comparison of the Average Risk Premiums before and after 1983
Before 1983 After 1983 Difference
Subsector (%) (%) (%) t-Stat.
Nonresidential
Ofﬁces 3.1 7.1 3.9 8.12*
Retail Shops 3.8 7.5 3.7 6.00*
Flatted Factories 6.0 9.1 3.1 5.85*
Residential
Class A 5.3 6.8 1.6 2.91*
Class B 4.8 6.5 1.7 3.44*
Class C 4.8 6.6 1.8 3.49*
Class D/E 4.2 6.7 2.4 4.94*
*signiﬁcant at the 99% level of conﬁdencegood. In Hong Kong, a large proportion of people living in private housing are owner-
occupiers. For owner-occupiers, since the residential units are purchased for satisfying
self-accommodation needs, rather than for the purpose of investment, the residential
capitalization rate is consequently less sensitive to changes in political risk. Exhibit 18
shows the proportion of newly completed residential units owned by owner-occupiers by
type of residential class. Smaller units (Class A, B and C) have a higher proportion of
owner occupiers when compared with larger units (Class D and E) and therefore the
increase in the risk premium is also smaller for smaller units (Exhibit 16).
Second, the other reason may be due to rent control for residential property. Such
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Exhibit 17
Comparison of Increase in Risk Premium for Different Types of
Residential Properties
Class A Class B Class C Class D/E
Class A 0.0%
Class B 0.1% 0.0%
(1.22)
Class C 0.2% 0.1% 0.0%
(1.62) (0.92)
Class D/E 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.0%
(5.10)* (5.68)* (5.45)*
Notes: Entries to the table are the difference in the increase in risk premium after 1983. Figures in
the brackets are the t-statistics.
*signiﬁcant at the 99% level of conﬁdence
Exhibit 18
Proportion of New Private Residential Units Purchased by Owner-Occupiers
(versus Investors) by Class
Class (%)
Year A B C D E
1986 94 93 88 75 26
1987 96 95 91 59 53
1988 93 94 90 74 40
1989 89 92 84 59 59
1990 79 81 76 52 15
1991 84 88 57 52 31
1992 83 92 77 52 32
1993 79 82 77 59 41
1994 75 81 63 52 46
Avg. 86 88 78 59 38controls place a cap on the rental increase possible for all pre-war units, as well as post-
war units below a certain ratable value, which is largely determined by size. This means
that the contract rent can deviate from the market clearing rent. Since the rent control
legislation effects the smaller units (lower ratable value) more than large units (larger
ratable value), the results are less signiﬁcant for smaller units (Exhibit 17).
On the other hand, the nonresidential property types are free from rent control and
thus the risk premium results are more reliable. Results for the nonresidential property
types show that after the 1997 issue had been revealed to the public, investors began
demanding a signiﬁcantly higher risk premium for investing in Hong Kong real estate
and that the increase in the risk premium persisted up to the end of 1994 (the end of the
period used in this study).
The implied post-1997 risk premiums (Rpa) for the nonresidential property types are
calculated from equation (8) using an iterative/numerical method. There is no solution
for Rpa for the quarter immediately after the 1997 issue was revealed to the public (1st
quarter 1983) in the retail subsector since the capitalized stream of rental income before
1997, assuming no 1997 issue (ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of equation (8)) is larger
than the observed capital value (the left-hand side of equation (8)). This implies that the
real estate asset will have a value less than zero or an inﬁnitely high-risk premium after
1997. This can be due to data errors, errors in the assumptions or investors’ over-
reaction. Since there is only one such point, it was excluded from the analysis. This will
not change the conclusion that the trend of Rpa has been decreasing towards 1997.
The resultant trends are shown in Exhibits 19 through 21. The dotted line shows the
implied pre-1997 risk premium (Rpb), which represents the risk premium had the 1997
issue not existed. The implied pre-1997 risk premium is estimated using the average
observed risk premium before 1983. The thin solid line shows the trend of the implied
post-1997 risk premium.
Although Rpa ﬂuctuates signiﬁcantly, a general downward sloping trend can still be
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Exhibit 19


























Estimated risk premium trend
Average pre-1983 risk premiumobserved. In order to test whether the underlying trend is signiﬁcant, Rpa is regressed on
the time variable (t) assuming a linear underlying trend, i.e.,
Rpa5a1bt . (11)
The results are shown in Exhibit 22. All slope parameters (b) are negative and
signiﬁcant at the 99% level of conﬁdence. The results suggest that investors in Hong Kong
are becoming increasingly conﬁdent about the post-1997 period, resulting in a downward
adjustment of the post-1997 risk premium. The thin lines in Exhibits 19 through 21 show
the estimated underlying trends. The results are similar when a log-linear trend of the
form ln(Rpa)5a1bt is used.
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Exhibit 21

























Estimated risk premium trend
Average pre-1983 risk premium
Exhibit 20

























Estimated risk premium trend
Average pre-1983 risk premiumOn the other hand, the Rpa trend is consistently above the Rpb trend for all the
commercial property types. This implies that investors, though becoming more conﬁdent
about Hong Kong’s future, are still uncertain abut the post-1997 period. The post-1997
risk premium has never gone down to that of the pre-1983 period when the 1997 issue did
not exist.
The results of investor conﬁdence surveys often suggest that the 1997 issue is a non-
issue and that investors have completely discounted the political risk associated with
1997. However this may need to be re-interpreted, given the ﬁndings in this study. While
investors are increasingly conﬁdent, they have not completely discounted their concerns
about Hong Kong’s investment environment in the post-1997 period, since the implied
post-1997 risk premiums are still (up to the end of 1994) above the pre-1983 level. People
who believe that the investors no longer take into account the 1997 repossession issue
have confused the ‘‘level’’ of risk and its ‘‘change’’ over time. A decreasing (increasing)
risk premium does not necessarily imply a low (high) level.
The interpretation of the results for opinion surveys done in Hong Kong also depends
upon how the questions in the survey were structured and interpreted by people being
surveyed. Since the 1997 issue was brought into the market more than fourteen years ago,
real estate investors, and particularly, those in the market for a long time, have taken this
event for granted. Survey ﬁndings that suggest that the 1997 issue was a non-issue could
be taken to mean a smooth transition scenario up to 1997. That means, all the adjust-
ments in the risk premiums had already taken place. That is, there would be no further
upward adjustment to the already upwards-adjusted premium after 1997. Interpreted this
way, the survey results do not necessarily contradict the empirical results of this study,
since the former does not imply that the 1997 issue had no impact upon the real estate
market. It merely suggests that the 1997 issue had already been taken into account. This
interpretation is also consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis.
Most investors believe that a complete re-valuation (resulting in decreased risk
premium) of the Hong Kong investment market (including the real estate market) has
already occurred in the past few years. However this study suggests that further re-
valuation in the real estate market is still possible, given the most optimistic scenario
under which the risk premiums fall back to the pre-1983 period. The implication is that
investors who are conﬁdent about Hong Kong’s future and believe that the post-1997
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Exhibit 22
Estimated Underlying Trends of the Post-1997 Risk Premiums
Ofﬁces Rpa512.2620.124t Adj. R250.21 F1,46513.33*
(13.19)* (3.65)*
Retail Shops Rpa511.0320.115t Adj. R250.24 F1,45515.71*
(13.80)* (3.96)*
Flatted Factories Rpa516.2920.182t Adj. R250.23 F1,46514.83*
(12.61)* (3.85)*
Note: Figures in brackets are the t-statistics. Rpa and t are in percentage points and number of
quarters, respectively.
*signiﬁcant at the 99% level of conﬁdenceperiod should not warrant a risk premium higher than that of the pre-1983 period should
take this opportunity to add Hong Kong real estate to their portfolios.
Summary and Conclusions
A method for assessing the impact of the 1997 repossession of Hong Kong by China on
the risk premium of investing in Hong Kong real estate is presented. The results of the
analysis indicate that the revealing of the 1997 issue to the general public in 1983 caused
a signiﬁcant increase in the risk premium for all the commercial subsectors of the real
estate market. Results from the residential subsectors are less obvious, due mainly to
complications arising from residential rent control which distort the observed rent.
Contrary to the beliefs of most people, the effects of the 1997 issue on the risk premium
have not completely dissipated. Investors still have some concerns about the uncertainty
resulting from the 1997 repossession of Hong Kong by China. On the other hand, the
results of this study are consistent with the common perception that investors are
becoming more conﬁdent about the future investment environment in Hong Kong, since
the underlying trends of the implied post-1997 risk premiums for all nonresidential real
estate subsectors are downward sloping. However, despite such downward-sloping
trends, the increase in risk premiums resulting from the 1997 issue has not totally
disappeared. Therefore while investor conﬁdence about Hong Kong’s future, in general,
increased towards 1997, it did not fall back to the pre-1983 level. This also implies that
there is still a possibility for another re-valuation. If the concern about the one-country,
two-systems arrangement proves to be unnecessary post-1997, there will be a
readjustment of Hong Kong’s investment market. All other things being equal, the
readjustment will result in a further decrease in the risk premium, and therefore, an
increase in real estate prices!
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